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CAN RELIGIOUS UNBELIEF BE PROPER
FUNCTION RATIONAL?
Michael Czapkay Sudduth

This paper presents a critical analysis of Alvin Plantinga's recent contention,
developed in Warranted Christian Beli'i (forthcoming), that if theism is true,
then it is unlikely that religious unbelief is the product of properly functioning,
truth-aimed cognitive faculties. More specifically, Plantinga argues that, given
his own model of properly basic theistic belief, religious unbelief would
always depend on cognitive malfunction somewhere in a person's noetic establishment. I argue that this claim is highly questionable and has adverse consequences for Plantinga's epistemology of religious belief. Plantinga's proper
basicality thesis together with his view of rationality defeaters suggests that
there are circumstances in which theistic belief would not be proper function
rational even if theism is true.

I. Introduction
In Warrant and Proper Function Ah'in Plantinga argued that a belief has
warrant, roughly, just if it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning
properly in a congenial environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth. In chapter 6 of Warranted Christian Belief (hereafter
WCB) Plantinga draws on Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin to present a
model of how theistic belief can have warrant in a basic way (i.e., without propositional evidence). Plantinga seems to affirm the following
proposition, a more recent variant of his earlier proper basicality thesis:
[PI] There are circumstances C such that, given any human person
S, if S is in C and S's (relevant) truth-aimed cognitive faculties are
functioning properly, then S holds a firm basic theistic belief.l
By "circumstances" I will understand any of the many widely realized experiential conditions that Plantinga points out in chapter 6 of
WCB, things like the starry night sky, the crashing waves of the ocean,
the majestic grandeur of the Vermont Mountains, and the lovely melody
of a Bach Concerto. Plantinga maintains that these sorts of circumstances
trigger the formation of various kinds of theistic beliefs: God is present,
is powerful, is forgiving, etc. (all of which self-evidently entail God
exists). By "relevant" cognitive faculties I refer to Calvin's sensus divinitatis, which Plantinga takes to be a natural faculty or mechanism that is
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responsible for producing various theistic beliefs. More specifically, "the

sensus divinitatis is a disposition or set of dispositions to form theistic
beliefs in various circumstances, in response to the sorts of conditions or
stimuli that trigger the working of this sense of divinity" (WCBM*' chapter 6).2 The experiential circumstances, of course, are not evidences that
are taken as premises from which theistic beliefs are derived by a
process of inference. The circumstances are simply occasions that trigger
the formation of theistic belief, so theistic belief is basic (i.e., not held on
the evidential basis of other beliefs). Plantinga further thinks that when
the sensus divinitatis is functioning properly we will hold a firm theistic
belief. More precisely, if a person's (relevant) cognitive faculties are
functioning properly and she is in any of the widely realized experiential circumstances (specified by the design plan), she will firmly hold
some theistic belief.
Plantinga also claims in chapter 6 that if theism is true then [PI] or
something close to it is likely to be a true epistemological proposition.
(He would also add that there are in fact some people who find themselves in the relevant circumstances and whose relevant cognitive faculties are functioning properly, and thus who hold a firm basic belief in
God). Plantinga presents the argument as follows. If one thinks of
humans as created by God, one will not think of theistic belief as the
product of belief forming processes aimed at something other than truth,
much less as the product of some intellectual defect. if God exists and
has created human persons in His image for the purpose of entering into
communion with Him, then it is natural to think that God desires us to
hold true beliefs about Him and our duties to Him. So He would probably create us in such a way that we can achieve this cognitive goal. This
seems likely if theism is true. But then it is also likely that the faculties
that produce theistic belief have been aimed at this end by their designer. In that case, theistic belief is the product of cognitive faculties functioning properly according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth.
Plantinga's notion of proper function rationality (hereafter PF-rationality) raises an interesting question: Can religious unbeliefbe PF-rationa17 (By "religious unbelief" I will understand, unless otherwise noted,
either withholding theistic belief or believing the negation of theism).
Plantinga thinks that if we do not assume a theistic metaphysics, an
affirmative answer could be given to this question. If Plantinga is right
about this a more interesting question would be whether religious unbelief could be PF-rational if theism is true. Plantinga argues that it cannot,
at least given his model of proper basicality. "Unbelief," he says, "is a
result of dysfunction, or brokenness, failure to function properly, or
impedance of rational faculties" (WCBM*' chapter 6). Plantinga presents
some very interesting arguments for This claim in chapter 14 of WCB.
However, r think the arguments are deeply problematic and entail significant difficulties for some of Plantinga's other important claims in
religious epistemology. To see this I begin by developing a case for the
PF-rationality of religious unbelief given some of Plantinga's own epistemological principles.
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II. A Case for the Proper Function Rationality of Religious Unbelief
A necessary condition of warrant is the proper functioning of one's
cognitive equipment. Fundamental to proper function is the cognitive
design plan - a set of blue prints or specifications for a well-formed,
properly functioning human cognitive system. Since the kind of specifications relevant for warrant are truth-oriented, they are specifications
for that segment of the cognitive design plan that has as its purpose the
production of true beliefs (as opposed to non-alethic purposes, such as
survival or relief from suffering). The design plan specifies what the
appropriate doxastic response of our cognitive faculties should be in a
wide range of circumstances to achieve this alethic goal in a reliable
manner.3
The design plan for humans also includes what Plantinga calls a
defeater system, a cognitive subsystem that is designed to regulate modifications in a person's noetic structure given new experiences and the
acquisition of new beliefs which come with social exposure, mental maturation, and education. In short, these are specifications as to the correct
or proper ways of changing beliefs in response to experience (doxastic
and otherwise). Generally, if a person acquires a defeater for a belief B,
then there ought to be a certain kind of revision in the person's noetic
structure. In some cases the person ought not to hold B with the same
degree of firmness (partial defeat). In other cases the proper response is
not to hold B at all (complete defeat). Defeaters, partial or complete, may
be reasons for no longer holding B (i.e., undercutters) or reasons for
holding a belief incompatible with B (i.e., rebutters). (Although
Plantinga has elsewhere taken defeaters to include non-doxastic experiences, I will confine myself in this paper to defeaters construed as other
beliefs of a person). A belief D is a defeater for a belief B of some person
S just if, given S's noetic structure, S cannot rationally hold B (at least to
some degree) given that S also holds D:
Plantinga cites a couple of examples of defeaters. I see in the distance
what appears to be a sheep in the field and form the belief that there is a
sheep in the field. The next day someone comes along whom I know is
the owner of the field and he tells me that there are no sheep in the field.
I have acquired, via testimony, a rebutting defeater for the belief that
there was a sheep in the field because I have acquired a reason for supposing that there was no sheep in the field. But there are also undercutting defeaters. A person enters a factory and sees an assembly line on
which there are a number of widgets. These appear red. Being appeared
to red-widgetly, the person forms the belief that there are red widgets on
the assembly line. The shop superintendent then informs the person that
the widgets are being irradiated by an infra red light, thereby enabling
the detection of otherwise undetectable hairline cracks. Here the person
merely loses his reason for supposing that the widgets are red. Both of
these cases presents us with a person (i) who holds some belief B at time
tI, (ii) whose noetic structure undergoes modification with respect to B
at time t2 after it comes to include the additional belief D, and (iii)
whose relevant cognitive faculties (we correctly judge) are functioning
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properly at t1 through t2. 5
Since the defeater system is aimed at the production and sustenance
of true beliefs, it forms an essential thread in the array of our rational
cognitive faculties. The proper function requirement for warrant, then,
extends to the proper functioning one's defeater system, what we might
call defeater-system PF-rationality. A person S's belief B is warranted
only if Sis PF-rational in holding B (to the degree that S does). And S is
PF-rational in holding B (to the degree that S does) only if the relevant
portions of S's defeater system are functioning properly and free from
impedance, functioning such that the appropriate revisions take place
with the acquisition of any defeaters against B.6 If there was no noetic
modification in the above cases, then the person's cognitive state would
not be PF-rational. Consequently, the belief B in each case would lack
warrant (to some degree).
So Plantinga holds to what we can call the rationality defeater principle:
[OP] Given any person S and any belief B, if S acquires a(n) (undefeated) defeater 0 for B, then S is no longer rational in holding B (at
least not with the same degree of firmness).7
It follows from [OP] that if a person acquired a(n) (undefeated)
defeater for theistic belief, then holding theistic belief (or doing so firmly) would be PF-irrational and not holding theistic belief (or not doing so
firmly) would be PF-rational.
Consider a case not too far removed from one that Plantinga himself
introduces.' Lisa has been raised in a Christian family. During her youth
she holds her theistic belief in a basic way, but in her later teenage years
her theistic belief isn't as strong. The cares of college life, sexual indulgence, and late-night parties slowly erode her thoughts of God. While a
senior in college, she is exposed to Sigmund Freud's idea of wish fulfillment. She becomes convinced that the belief she had in an invisible
friend called Merlin while a young girl was one such belief. Upon further reflection, though, she sees that her belief in God is significantly
analogous to the belief she once had in the invisible Merlin. So she
comes to believe that (p) her belief in God is really the product of wish
fulfillment, a convenient defense mechanism against the hostile forces of
one's environment. Her readings in Freud confirm this. Moreover, she
also believes that (q) the objective probability of a belief being true given
that it is produced by wish fulfillment is either low or inscrutable. (I say
"or inscrutable" here because perhaps she is simply agnostic about the
probability of a belief being true given that it was produced by wish fulfillment, rather than estimating that probability to be low). She then
believes that the objective probability of her theistic belief being true is
either low or inscrutable. Lisa has acquired an undercutting defeater for
her theistic belief. If her defeater is partial and itself undefeated (as
might be the case if she didn't hold either p or q very firmly), then the
rational thing to do would be to hold her theistic belief less firmly than
she did before acquiring this defeater. Perhaps her defeater is complete
and itself undefeated (e.g., she has great enthusiasm for projective theo-
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ries of religious belief or alternatively her theistic belief is very weak
before encountering p and q), then if she is PF-rational she will no
longer hold her theistic belief at alP
Then there is Elvis' problem of evil. Elvis is a very devout believer in
God raised in an Assembly of God Church in Tupelo, Mississippi. While
in the Army, Elvis' mother Gladys dies of a heart attack. As a result,
Elvis loses his faith. He reasons thus: (A) if there is a God, then God
would not permit my mother to die unless he had a good reason for
doing so, (B) my mother is dead and God had no reason for permitting
her to die, therefore (C) there is no God. Elvis has acquired a rebutting
defeater. If Elvis holds (A) and (B) very firmly and sees the deductive
entailment (C), then Elvis probably has a complete rebutting defeater for
his theistic belief. The rational thing to do is no longer hold theistic belief
(maybe even hold the negation of theism). If he continued to hold his
theistic belief, even in a less than firm manner, he would not be PF-rational. On the other hand, it is possible that Elvis does not hold the second
conjunct of (B) very firmly and so in fact has simply acquired a partial
defeater. The rational thing to do is no longer hold his theistic belief
with the same degree of firmness. If Elvis continued to hold his theistic
belief with the same degree of firmness, that belief would not be PFrational. Since PF-rationality is necessary for warrant, Elvis' theistic
belief would not be warranted. And since warrant is necessary for
knowledge, Elvis would not know that God exists.
It is important to point out that the argument here for the PF-rationality of religious unbelief is logically consistent with [PI]. What follows
from [PI] is that if a person is in the relevant circumstances and does not
hold a firm theistic belief, holds no theistic belief, or believes the negation of theism, he suffers from some cognitive malfunction, or perhaps
his cognitive state has been produced by something other than truthaimed cognitive faculties. In addition to circumstances C (that call for
firm theistic belief), there are plausibly circumstances C* which include
having an undefeated defeater for theistic belief. Here, depending on the
actual defeater, the appropriate doxastic response for a reasonable person will be withholding theistic belief, holding the negation of theism, or
merely holding a less than firm theistic belief. The relevant analogy here
can be taken from the conditions that govern the PF-rationality of sensory perceptual, testimonial, and memorial beliefs. If a circumstance
includes being appeared to rainly, then I am PF-rational in holding the
belief that it is raining outside, unless of course the relevant circumstance includes my having defeaters for such beliefs. So even if [PI] is
likely if theism is true, it would not follow that it is likely that religious
unbelief is PF-irrational if theism is true. This point is significant and I
will return to it in section IV.

III. Degrees of Rationality and Irrationality Transference
Although Plantinga allows for the possibility that Lisa and Elvis each
acquires a defeater for theistic belief, he maintains that the cognitive state
of religious unbelief is not therefore PF-rational. lO ,ll Plantinga claims that
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if a person has a defeater for theistic belief it is because there is malfunction elsewhere in the person's cognitive system. This is developed in
chapter 14 of WCB. Plantinga's main contention here is that if a person
acquired a defeater for theistic belief, then there would have to be cognitive malfunction elsewhere in the person's cognitive system, most likely
in the sensus divinitl7tis itself. With reference to the problem of evil as a
defeater for theistic belief, Plantinga writes: "What it is important to see,
here, is that if she does have a defeater, it is only because of a failure of
rationality somewhere in her noetic structure (perhaps there is dysfunction with respect to the sensus divinitatis)" (WCBM*, ch. 14).
I think we can provide an initial formulationm Plantinga's argument
here by laying down what appears to be the argument's two main
premises:
[P2] Given any fallen person S(f), if S(f) acquires a defeater D for
some theistic belief T, then S(f)'s acquiring D depends on cognitive
malfunction in another relevant cognitive module.
[P3] Given any fallen person S(f), if S(f)'s acquiring a defeater D for
some theistic belief T depends on cognitive malfunction in another
relevant cognitive module, then the cognitive state of religious
unbelief is not PF-rational.
Let's begin by addressing the clause "S(f)'s acquiring D depends on
cognitive malfunction in another relevant cognitive module." One way
of unpacking these premises is to parse this clause in terms of "irrational
input to the defeater system." Plantinga does not explicitly state this, but
I think it is a plausible way of thinking of the notion of a defeater's
depending on cognitive malfunction. In other words, defeating reasons
may include a belief that was produced by a malfunctioning cognitive
faculty. If we go this route, Plantinga's argument would involve something like an irrationality transference principle, according to which irrationality is transferred from an irrational defeating reason to the cognitive state based on it. If belief B is based on belief A, and A is PF-irrational, then B is PF-irrational. The PF-rationality of a cognitive state
based on defeaters would then require that defeating reasons not be produced by any defective faculties. Religious unbelief then would be PFirrational because defeaters for it in some way take as input beliefs that
have been produced by some dysfunctional faculty.
Two important distinctions need to be made here. First, we need to
distinguish between the cognitive state of religious unbelief and the
defeater that is in some way responsible for that cognitive state. We can
evaluate each in terms of PF-rationality. Secondly, we need to distinguish different degrees of PF-rationality based on something like depth of
rationality ingression. In a foundationalist scheme beliefs have different
degrees of depth of ingression depending on where they are located
within a person's noetic structure (specifically, how close they are to the
foundations and how much of the doxastic content of the superstructure
depends on them). Similarly, we can say that there is a depth of ingres-
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sion with respect to the PF-rationality of beliefs, and that this is a determinant, maybe the primary determinant, of the degree of PF-rationality
of a cognitive state. Suppose that a malfunction in some cognitive faculty f1 produces some belief p that, together with a belief q produced by a
properly function faculty f2, functions as input to the defeater system.
Suppose further that, given these conditions, if the defeater system is
functioning properly it would produce the belief r. The suggestion is
that the cognitive state <belief that r> is PF-rational to some degree, and
its degree of PF-rationality is greater than the degree of PF-rationality
for the cognitive state <belief that p>. The latter is directly produced by
cognitive malfunction and has what we might call a zeroeth degree of
PF-rationality ingression. The former is the product of some properly
functioning faculties (two to be exact), though it also includes an irrational belief as input to the defeater system. It has a degree of PF-rationality ingression greater than zero, but not maximal. A maximally PFrational cognitive state would be one that is produced solely by truth
aimed, properly functioning cognitive faculties and - if nonbasic - is
located on an inferential path which has no irrational beliefs.
It would seem, then, that the irrationality transference principle is
mistaken. Religious unbelief might have a degree of PF-rationality
ingression greater than zero, even if the defeating reasons producing it
do not. We can plausibly read Elvis and Lisa's cognitive states of religious unbelief at least as instances of less than maximal PF-rationality.
In fact, one might argue that their defeaters are maximally rational." But
the important point is that even if the defeaters were less than maximally rational, they would still be epistemically significant. Plantinga himself seems to concur, for he admits in his unpublished "Naturalism
Defeated" and in WCB (chapter 11) that an irrational belief can function
as a rationality defeater. Suppose I believe that all cats are benign creatures, but then due to some rare feline phobia I come to believe that my
cat Salem crawls to my face at night with the intention of suffocating me
(and that perhaps he conspires in this with other neighborhood cats).
According to Plantinga, I thereby acquire a rationality defeater for my
previous belief that all cats are kind and benign creatures, even though
the defeating reasons have a zeroeth degree of PF-rationality ingression,
with the malfunction occurring in another relevant cognitive module. As
a result of acquiring this defeater, not only is my previous optimistic
feline belief no longer rational but that belief no longer has warrant (at
least not to the same degree).
This suggests that a particular doxastic state can be epistemically significant and PF-rational even if that doxastic state supervenes on cognitive malfunction by way of irrational input to the defeater system. In the
above case, is my doxastic state maximally rational? No. The input to the
defeater system includes beliefs that were produced by cognitive malfunction. In fact, the belief has little if anything in the way of warrant.
Something is wrong with me, but if I continued to hold my optimistic
feline belief two things would be wrong with me, as my failure to modify
my optimistic feline belief indicates a second cognitive defect (related to
the proper functioning of my defeater system). So it seems that the
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human design plan at least sometimes specifies that withholding belief
(or holding a belief less firmly) is called for even when this depends on
dysfunction somewhere else in one's cognitive system. Since a belief can
lose warrant if a person acquires a defeater for it, an irrational belief can
defeat warrant as well. So nothing in principle robs a cognitive state of
epistemic significance just because it was produced by cognitive
processes that include a less than maximally rational defeater. Of course,
it does not necessarily follow that the same thing is true for theistic
belief. But on what grounds can we affirm this of other beliefs and deny
it for theistic belief in particular without the appearance of arbitrary
epistemic partiality?

IV. Proper Basicality, Relevant Analogs, and Rationality Defeaters
Well, perhaps we have moved too quickly. I have been assuming that
Plantinga's argument for the irrationality of religious unbelief depends
on a claim about irrational input to the defeater system, where that irrationality is allegedly transferred to the cognitive state of religious unbelief. But parsing lP2] and lP3] in this way is not the only way to go. We
might simply understand a defeater's depending on malfunction in
another relevant cognitive module to refer to the malfunctioning of a cognitive faculty that is designed to produce theistic belief. On this way of
looking at things, Plantinga could affirm the possibility of maximally
rational defeaters for theistic belief but still deny that religious unbelief is
PF-rational. Plantinga could respond that even if Elvis or Lisa each has a
maximally rational defeater for theistic belief, the fact that they end up in
a state of religious unbelief shows us that sometliing is wrong. He claims
that this points to a malfunctioning ficnsus divinitatis. Planting a writes:
"On the extended A/C model, the scnsus divinitatis is among our cognitive faculties or processes; if it is functioning properly in S, then the belief
that there is such a person as God will automatically have warrant for"
(WCBM*, chapter 14). Again he writes of the sensus divinitatis: "Someone
in whom this process was functioning properly would have an intimate,
detailed, vivid and explicit knowledge of God .... but the idea that perhaps there just wasn't any such person as God would no doubt not so
much as cross her mind" (WCBM*, chapter 14). So the irrationality of
religious unbelief is not due to irrational input to the defeater system, but
the malfunctioning of a faculty designed to produce theistic belief.
Plantinga then seems to be affirming the following proposition (as an
entailment of [P2]):
[P4]

Given any fallen human person S(f), S(f) has some cognitive faculty F (i.e., the senslIs divinitatis), such that if F is
functioning properly, S(f) holds a firm theistic belief T.

It follows from [P4] that Elvis's holding a less than firm belief that T,
or failing to hold T altogether, is an indication of cognitive malfunction
(or impedance), even if Elvis has a defeater for T. Elvis acquires a defeater
for theistic belief, at least in part, because the scnsus divinitatis (hereafter
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SD) is malfunctioning, not because another faculty produces an irrational
belief that forms part of the defeater. If the SD were functioning properly, then a person would probably not acquire a defeater for theistic belief
in the first place (and if he did, he would have a defeater-defeater for this
defeater in the form of the output of the SD). On the other hand, if the SD
is damaged or non-operational, a person might not have a firm belief in
God, thereby rendering him susceptible to acquiring a defeater for theistic belief and moving further into religious unbelief.
Plantinga has offered two analogies to support this position. 13 First,
suppose that a student acquires a good argument for believing that he
no longer exists, say under the influence of his persuasive philosophy
professor. Would giving up his belief in his own existence be rational?
No, Plantinga says, not at all. Secondly, suppose a woman comes to
believe that her cognitive faculties are unreliable because she thinks she
has contracted mad-cow disease. According to Plantinga she has a rationality defeater for all her beliefs since she has a reason for supposing
that her cognitive faculties are not reliable. Perhaps the defeater is even
a maximally rational one (i.e., does not depend on irratonal input to the
defeater system). If we traced its path through the women's noetic structure we would not find a defective segment anywhere in route to the
foundations. But Plantinga affirms that proper function would not
require that she give up all her beliefs. "That way lies sheer madness." I
take Plantinga's point here to be that the design plan does not stipulate
universal doxastic abstention under any circumstances. So no matter
what reasons a person acquired for thinking that her faculties were not
reliable, she ought not to give up all her beliefs. (Of course, since
Plantinga construes "having a defeater in some circumstance" as determined by the design plan, if the design plan doesn't make provision for
withholding all beliefs under any circumstance, it would seem that the
woman can't even get a defeater for all her beliefs). Plantinga would
have us regard a cognitive state of religious unbelief in the presence of
defeaters as analogous to universal doxastic abstention in the presence
of a defeater for the reliability of our cognitive faculties. If the latter is
not a PF-rational cognitive state, neither is the former. As universal doxastic abstention, or no longer believing in one's own existence, is not PFrational given the acquisition of any set of defeating reasons, so also religious unbelief is not PF-rational given the acquisition of any set of
defeating reasons for theistic belief.
The argument against the PF-rationality of religious unbelief comes
down to the plausibility of [P4], and this question in turn depends on the
extent to which [P4] can draw support from the kind of analogies that
Plantinga presents. As I see it, there are problems here. The most serious
problem is that [P4], and the supporting analogical argument, entails a
significantly different formulation of the proper basicality thesis than the
one Plantinga endorses elsewhere. For instance, in chapter 6 of WCB,
when Plantinga lays out the model for warranted basic theistic belief,
the proper functioning of the SD is always associated with or qualified
by a definite range of experiential input, in a way analogous to the formation of sensory perceptual beliefs.
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Plantinga writes:
There is a kind of faculty or cognitive mechanism ... which in a
wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God ...
.Under these circumstances ... these beliefs are formed in us .... The
sensus divinitatis is a disposition or set of dispositions to form theistic beliefs in various circumstances, in response to the sorts of conditions or stimuli that trigger the workings of this sense of divintity .... According to the model, therefore, there are many circumstances, and circumstances of manv different kinds, that call forth
or occasion theistic belief. Here the sensus divinitatis resembles
other belief-producing faculties or mechanisms. If we wish to think
in terms of the overworked functional analogy, we can think of the
sensus divinitatis too as an input-output device: it takes the circumstances mentioned above as input and issues output theistic beliefs,
beliefs about God" (WCBM*' chapter 6).
But the formulation that emerges in the discussion on defeaters omits
the circumstance relative nature of the theistic belief-forming process
and its dependence on certain experiential input that triggers theistic
belief. This is no minor variation. The earlier view, formulated in [PI], is
logically consistent with a person's SD functioning properly and the person not holding theistic belief (or not holding it firmly), for in [PI] the
proper functioning of the SD is contextually situated in a limited range
of circumstances. Plantinga's argument for the dependence of defeaters
on SO malfunction and the irrationality of religious unbelief seems to
depend in a most crucial wayan [P4]. But it follows from [P4] that religious unbelief is PF-irrational and theistic belief PF-rational in any circumstance, not just those referred to in [PI]. Although Plantinga is certainly free to develop his own epistemological model for warranted theistic belief, the problem is that in fact he has two different models, [PI]
and [P4]. The first is consistent with the PF-rationality of religious unbelief in some circumstances; the second is not.
Can't Plantinga just drop [PI] and assert [P4]? Well, he certainly
could, but should he? The likelihood of [PI] given the truth of theism is
itself controversial, as it is not clear how the truth of theism makes it
likely that we should hold theistic belief in a basic (as opposed to nonbasic) way. [P4] would be even more controversial. It would require
affirming that God not only wants us to have true beliefs about him that
are formed in a basic way, but that it is likely that he wants us to have
basic beliefs about him (or at least his existence) that could not be subject
to defeat, except on the condition of irrationality.
More importantly, Plantinga's taking [P4] as the model will really
depend on the extent to which Plantinga wants to draw crucial analogies
between theistic belief and certain other paradigmatic properly basic
beliefs. For instance, when it comes to defending basic theistic belief
against the charge of fideism (in chapter 10 of WCB), Plantinga is quick
to establish the similarity between basic theistic belief and other basic
beliefs that are not immune to defeat just because they are basic.
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Plantinga says: "Theistic belief would certainly not be immune to argument and defeat just by virtue of being basic. In this, theistic belief only
resembles other kinds of beliefs accepted in the basic way" (WCB M *,
chapter 10). His three examples are beliefs accepted on testimony, sensory perceptual beliefs, and Gottlob Frege's belief that for every property
or condition, there exists the set of just those things. Plantinga seems to
be saying that the design plan for basic theistic belief is similar to the
design plan for some other basic beliefs in that they share the property
of being susceptible to defeat, and defeat without irrationality anywhere
else in one's cognitive system. 14
This tells us something important about the faculty responsible for
theistic belief, or at least how Planting a is thinking of it. In the case of
sensory perceptual beliefs, the relevant cognitive module responsible for
the formation of such beliefs is designed to function properly and yield
certain beliefs as output given certain experiential input and given the
exclusion of sufficient reasons to the contrary. Upon being appeared to
rainly, I form the belief that it is raining outside. If the relevant portions
of my cognitive system are functioning properly, then I will hold the
belief that it is raining outside. But note, my failure to believe it is raining outside is not by itself an indication of cognitive malfunction. I
might not be in the relevant circumstance that is specified by the design
plan (i.e., being appeared to rainly). Alternatively, perhaps the circumstance I am in includes being appeared to rainly as well as reasons for
supposing either that this belief is false or that its ground is inadequate.
Take the situation where I hear "pitter-patter, trickle, trickle, drip, drip"
coming from outside and I see drops of water hitting against my kitchen
window. I form the belief it is raining outside. But then a friend of mine
comes in (perhaps drenched with water) and tells me that there's some
crazy old man outside who's spraying water everywhere (and I have no
reason to believe that my friend is lying to me). So I no longer believe
that it is raining outside. Is there any cognitive malfunction here? No.
My holding a less than firm belief that it is raining outside is compatible
with the proper functioning of the cognitive faculties which produced
that belief in me in the first place. In fact, I would be PF-rational in withholding the belief even if it was raining outside (perhaps the old man
always sprays water on people when it is raining outside). And the same
argument could be made for testimonial beliefs and the Frege example. 15
Now Plantinga is surely correct about one thing. It does seem reasonable to suppose that the design plan rules out some cognitive states as
PF-rational, even if the state is grounded, allegedly at any rate, in a
defeater. Plantinga's two examples are appropriate candidates here. But
we can dig deeper. One of the modules of our cognitive establishment is
responsible for what we might broadly call self-knowledge. It produces
beliefs like "I exist" and a broad range of introspective beliefs about one's
current states of consciousness (e.g., I am in pain, I am being appeared to
redly). It is widely held, though not beyond controversy, that such beliefs
possess certain epistemic immunities: immunity from doubt (indubitability), error (infallibility), or revision (incorrigibility). The concept of defeat
only seems appropriate when beliefs do not have such properties. The
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notion that such beliefs involve some kind of privileged epistemic access
makes it difficult to see how a person could acquire a defeater for them
and actually come to doubt them without us supposing that something
has gone terribly wrong with the person. In the case of my believing that
I'm being appeared to redly, the self-presenting doxastic state is produced from the input <being appeared to redly>. If the faculty (or subfaculties) responsible for introspective beliefs is functioning properly
then whenever we have the corresponding experiential input, then we
hold the belief that we are being appeared to a certain way. Unlike the
case of a sensory perceptual belief (e.g., it is raining outside), there are no
circumstances that could include the relevant experiential input to the
belief forming mechanism without yielding the relevant introspective
belief, at least not without malfunction somewhere. Even if a person
acquired apparent defeating reasons for the introspective belief, she
would (if rational) continue to hold this belief with the same degree of
firmness. In the case of belief in my own existence, it is reasonable to suppose that if my cognitive faculties are functioning properly then I will
never withhold the belief or hold its negation.
This can also help us think about Plantinga's woman who doubts the
reliability of her cognitive faculties because she thinks she has contracted mad cow disease. What exactly happens here? The woman acquires
reasons for supposing that her cognitive faculties are unreliable. But the
woman must assume that some of her cognitive faculties are reliable if
she has any reason for supposing that her cognitive faculties are not reliable. Well, perhaps the woman does not consciously assume this, but it
certainly seems presupposed in a significant sense by her having a
defeater in this situation and recognizing it. Without at least an implicit
commitment to or belief in the reliability of at least some of her cognitive
processes, specifically the ones responsible for producing her alleged
defeating reasons, she really has no good reason for supposing that her
cognitive faculties are unreliable. We could then handle this counterexample by saying that the design plan for our cognitive establishment
precludes as instances of proper function all cognitive processes that
involve this kind of self-referential incoherence or self-defeat, as it runs
contrary to the truth goal of the cognitive design plan. Perhaps we can
generalize a bit and say that if the holding of any apparently defeating
reasons D for some belief B entails the holding of the defeatee, then D
cannot be a defeater for B. Suppose, though, that a person believed that
<if God does not exist, then one's cognitive faculties are not reliable>. If
one acquired a rebutting defeater for God's existence, then one would
probably be in a similar circumstance as the woman above. Here the
holding of one's defeating reasons would be inconsistent with withholding the defeatee. But this is obviously a special case and would not be
true of just any defeater for theistic belief.
It is reasonable to suppose that some of the faculties of our noetic
establishment are such that if we are in some circumstance (such as
being appeared to a certain way), then nothing could be added to the
circumstance (in the way of reasons to the contrary) to make withholding the corresponding belief PF-rational. Similarly, there are faculties
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that, if functioning properly, preclude the withholding of certain
belief(s) under any circumstances. We might suppose that in both of
these cases the original belief is actually a defeater against any potential
defeater. If a philosophy professor gives me a good argument for the
proposition that I do not exist, it would seem that my belief that I do
exist (held firmly and PF-rational) has so much more by way of warrant
that it could simply crush such an argument. I have no reason to take the
argument seriously at all. Also, there will be certain alleged defeating
reasons for some beliefs (like belief in the reliability of our cognitive faculties) that implicitly involve a commitment to the truth of the defeatee.
It would not be rational to withhold belief in such cases.
Operating inductively from these cases I think we can frame criteria
for the kinds of beliefs that cannot be withheld without supposing that
the faculty that produces them is malfunctioning. Since Plantinga has
elsewhere suggested such an approach to understand what beliefs are
properly basic, it would be reasonable to take such an approach in trying to determine what doxastic withholdings can be PF-rational and
which not. First, these would be beliefs that have epistemic immunities
that render the notion of defeat logically inapplicable to them. Secondly,
there will be doxastic states that are self-referentially incoherent or
where the grounds for withholding belief presupposes a person's commitment to the truth of the defeatee. Perhaps further examples could be
draw from the cognitive modules responsible for our belief in some a
priori propositions (e.g., analytically true propositions) and all doxastic
withholdings in the case inconsistent propositions (that we see to be
inconsistent at any rate). But theistic belief really doesn't satisfy these
criteria. So a person's acquiring defeaters for theistic belief can be PFrational since theistic belief does not share the necessary properties that
would make it immune to rationality defeat.

v. Conclusion
Warranted Christian Belief presents some strong claims about the irrationality of religious unbelief, based on the truth of theism and
Plantinga's model of properly basic theistic belief. Plantinga claims that
if theism is true, then his proper basicality model (or something close to
it) is likely to be true. I have argued that in fact Plantinga has two models, and that the PF-rationality of religious unbelief is logically inconsistent with only one of them, the model that includes [P2] and [P4]. But
neither of these propositions appears likely if theism is true. In fact,
these formulations seem most unlikely if other aspects of Plantinga's
epistemology are correct or logically consistent. If these formulations
were true, Plantinga would lose what has hitherto been an important
component of his religious epistemology - the parity between basic theistic belief and other basic beliefs that are susceptible to defeat and for
which there can be PF-rational doxastic withholdings. Denying this
leaves Reformed epistemology quite vulnerable to the charge of fideism.
Conversely, insulating Reformed epistemology from this charge would
seem to require that there are circumstances in which religious unbelief
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can be PF-rational, even if theism is true. Theistic belief is not beyond
rational appraisal or proper function rationality defeat.'"

Saint Michael's College
NOTES
1. This claim is significantly different from another formulation of the
proper basicality thesis (also found in Warranted Christian Belief): theistic belief
held in a basic way is proper function rational or warranted if theism is true.
Here theistic belief and proper function are not situationally indexed or made
relative to any set of circumstances. I will discuss the significance of this alternative formulation in section IV.
2. References to Warranted Christian Belief (WCB) will be given parenthetically in the text by chapter. WCBMdndicates that quotations are from
Plantinga's 1997-98 unpublished manuscripts of WCB. Unfortunately, since
this paper was completed in advance of the proofs for WCB, I am unable to
supply page numbers.
3. The position is externalist since the proper functioning of one's cognitive system is not the sort of thing to which a person has introspective access
or could come to know just by reflecting on one's mental states. Viewed this
way warrant entails a kind of externalist rationality. In Plantinga's scheme,
there are three closely related senses in which a belief can be externally rational. A belief is externally rational if it is the product of properly functioning
cognitive faculties, that is, if there is an absence of cognitive dysfunction,
impairment, disorder, or pathology in some person's holding B. But a particular doxastic state might be the product not of malfunction but of properly
functioning cognitive faculties in some way overridden by certain emotional
states (e.g., anger, ambition, lust). So a belief can also be externally rational in
the sense that it was produced by properly functioning cognitive powers not
impeded, inhibited, or overridden by emotions of a certain type. But external
rationality is, more narrowly speaking, a matter of a belief being a deliverance
of one's rational faculties, being produced by properly functioning (and unimpeded) cognitive faculties successfully aimed at truth. External rationality in
this third sense is directly connected to warrant. In this paper I refer to it as
proper function (pr; rationality. A belief will lack warrant if it is PF-irrational,
and a belief is PF-irrational if it is produced by (i) cognitive malfunction, (ii)
properly functioning cognitive faculties overridden by certain emotions, or
(iii) properly functioning cognitive faculties not aimed at the production of
true beliefs.
4. In chapter 11 of WeB Plantinga offers two definitions of a defeater.
According to his preliminary definition: "(D) 0 is a defeater of B for 5 at t iff
(1) S's noetic structure N (i.e., S's beliefs and experiences and salient relations
among them) at t includes B, and S comes to believe 0 at t, and (2) any person
(a) whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the relevant respects,
(b) whose noetic structure is N and includes B, and (c) who comes at t to
believe 0 but nothing else independent of or stronger than 0 would withhold
B (or believe it less strongly)." However, Plantinga admits that this definition
is faulty, for one might have a rationality defeater for some belief B while the
proper functioning of non-truth aimed cognitive faculties or processes
requires the holding of B (e.g., for psychological comfort or survival). So
Plantinga adds the notion of a "purely epistemic defeater" in contrast to a

RELIGIOUS UNBELIEF AND PROPER FUNCTION

311

"defeater simpliciter": (D*) D is a purely epistemic defeater of B for S at t iff (1)
S's noetic structure N at t includes Band S comes to believe D at t, and (2) any
person S* (a) whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the relevant respects, (b) who is such that the bit of the design plan governing the sustaining of B in her noetic structure is successfully aimed at truth, (i.e., at the
maximization of true belief and minimization of false belief) and nothing
more, (c) whose noetic structure is N and includes B, and (d) who comes to
believe D but nothing else independent of or stronger than D, would withhold
B (or believe it less strongly)." In cases where the only processes governing the
production or sustaining of a belief are truth aimed, a purely epistemic
defeater will be a defeater simpliciter. I will assume this distinction throughout. For Plantinga's other discussions on defeaters, see "Naturalism Defeated"
(December 1994 draft, unpublished) and "Reliabilism, Analyses, and
Defeaters," Philosophy and Phenomenological [<-esearch 55 (1995), pp. 334-342.
5. In "Reliabilism, Analyses, and Defeaters," Planting a says that "a
defeater D for a proposition (for a person S) must be such that it lowers the
epistemic probability of the prospective defeatee: it must be the case that the
epistemic probability of the proposed defeatee on the conjunction of D with
the relevant rest of S's noetic structure is lower than on that relevant rest
alone" (p. 441). Of course, for Plantinga, the conditional epistemic probability
of A on B is a matter of the degree to which a rational person will accept A
given that she also accepts B, reflectively considers A in the light of B, and has
no other source of warrant for A (or its denial). So whether a person has a
defeater for some belief really depends on the specifications of the design
plan. It isn't entirely clear how narrow (or broad) those specifications should
be, and Planting a formulates no general principles here but merely relies on
examples that carry with them a good degree of intuitive plausibility.
Presumably we could formulate general principles from an induction of such
samples, much like the method Plantinga suggests for determining the criteria
of proper basicality. I leave that project for another time.
6. The concept of defeat under consideration here is clearly externalist,
since it concerns what can rationally be believed in the sense of cognitive
proper function. So we can speak of such defeaters as external rationality
defeaters. However, since the reasons that serve to defeat a belief include other
beliefs of the person, they are the sort of thing to which a person has cognitive
or introspective access upon reflection. The defeaters, then, are also internalist
defeaters (perhaps what William Alston refers to under the rubric of perspectival internalism in his" An Internalist Externalism" in Epistemic Justification
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989)). As such, they should be distinguished from defeaters construed as merely some external fact about the subject's environment or cognitive situation that negatively affects the positive
epistemic status of a person's belief. There is also an important connection
between defeaters, internalism, and warrant. A person's belief will fail to have
warrant if it is produced by cognitive faculties that are not functioning properly, not aimed at truth, or if there is something awry in one's epistemic environment. Since these are all design plan specifications to which a person does
not have introspective access, the kind of defeat they produce is externalist.
What gets defeated is the warrant a belief has. But if I acquire an internalist
rationality defeater for my belief that p and the design plan specifies that I
hold my belief that p less firmly, but I continue to hold it with the same
degree of firmness, my belief is not externally or PF-rational. So my belief will
lack warrant for externalist reasons that involve the failure of my cognitive
system to respond properly to certain internalist conditions, namely the acquisition of some new belief(s). Internalist rationality defeaters, then, (because
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they defeat what can rationally be believed in the sense of proper function)
can also be externalist warrant defeaters (though not all warrant defeaters are
rationality defeaters). This highlights a more general point about internalist
rationality in relation to warrant. A belief is internally rational just if it is the
appropriate doxastic response to what is given to a person by way of her previous beliefs and current experience. Warrant appears to require both internal
and external rationality. For a discussion on the internalist and externalist contours of Plantinga's rationality defeaters, see my "The Internalist Character
and Evidentialist Implications of Plantingian Defeaters," The International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion (forthcoming 1999).
7. Defeaters often consist of more than one belief. Suppose I believe that
(p) John cannot swim, and then I learn that (q) John is a lifeguard and I also
believe (r) all lifeguards can swim. I have a rebutting defeater for my belief
that p. But it isn't necessarily the case that my continuing to hold p along with
q is irrational. If I learn that (s) a special class of lifeguards need not be able to
swim (e.g., perhaps they are spotters) and (t) John has a spotter insignia sticker on his car, then I could be PF-rational in continuing to hold p and q.
Although I continue to hold one of the defeating reasons, the defeating force
of the defeater (as a whole) has been neutralized by a reason for thinking that
the other defeating reason (r) is false. This is an example of a defeater being
defeated. So in [DP] we must say that the kind of defeater that defeats a person's rationally continuing to hold some belief is an undefeated defeater.
8. See Warrranted Christian Belief, chapter 11; Warrant and Proper Function
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 229-231; and "Reliabilism,
Analyses, and Defeaters," pp. 336-342.
9. Given the importance of this example, I offer two quotes from
Plantinga's own version of the example. "Compare the case of a believer in
God, who, perhaps through an injudicious reading of Freud, comes to think
that religious belief generally and theistic belief in particular is almost always
produced by wish fulfillment. Such beliefs, she now thinks, are not produced
by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial environment
according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth; instead they are produced by wish fulfillment, which, while indeed it has a function, does not
have the function of producing true beliefs. Suppose she considers the objective probability that wish fulfillment, as a belief producing mechanism, is reliable. She might quite properly estimate this probability as relatively low;
alternatively, however, she think the right course, here, is agnosticism; she
might also be equally agnostic about the probability that a belief should be
true, given that it is produced by wish fulfillment. But then in either case she
has a defeater for any belief she takes to be produced by the mechanism in
question ... .she ... has an undercutting defeater for belief in God; if that
defeater remains itself undefeated and if she has no other source of evidence,
then the rational course would be to reject belief in God. That is not say, of
course, that she would in fact be able to do so; but it remains the rational
course" (Warrant and Proper Function, pp. 230-231). In WCB Plantinga writes:
"Projective theories like Freud's could be a defeater for theistic belief (and
hence for Christianity) for some people. Suppose I believe very firmly that if
theism is true, there couldn't be any coherent projective theories of religious
or theistic belief; suppose I also accept theism, though not particularly firmly.
Now suppose that I then come to believe that (F) Freud's theory (or some
other projective theory) is indeed coherent. (F) will then be a defeater - perhaps a partial defeater - for my theistic belief; as long as I accept it and continue to accept the rest of my noetic structure (including the idea that theism is
true only if there are no coherent projective theories of theistic belief), I can't
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rationally accept theism. Of course that idea is false; but a false belief can
nonetheless serve as a defeater" (chapter 11).
10. 1 take Plantinga's position here to be a denial of the external rationality
of religious unbelief, not a denial of its internal rationality. Although internal
rationality seems to be necessary for PF-rationality and warrant, it is not sufficient. See endnote no. 6 for this distinction.
11. Although Plantinga does concede that there can be defeaters for theistic belief (in a less than fully rational noetic structure), in chapter 14 he also
argues that perhaps the problem of evil is not a defeater for theistic belief at
all. Why? If the sensus divinitatis is damaged, then a person might very well
come to believe that the existence of God is improbable given the facts of evil
and fall into agnosticism or atheism. In this situation, though, one cognitive
module (i.e., the module responsible for probability judgements) is functioning properly, but another module (i.e., the sensus divinitatis) is not. However, if
the two modules are designed to function in tandem, how things go when in
fact one is not functioning properly is not necessarily a part of the design plan.
So religious unbelief is more properly viewed as an unintended by-product of
malfunction in the SD plus proper function elsewhere, but since this need not
be any part of the design plan, religious unbelief need not be construed as PFrational.
12. Lisa comes to believe that her belief in an imaginary friend while a
young girl was really due to wish fulfillment. She also thinks that the objective
probability of beliefs being true if they are produced by wish fulfillment is
either low or inscrutable. She sees strong analogies between this belief and her
theistic belief. She becomes convinced that her theistic belief is also the product of wish fulfillment and that its objective probability of being true is thus
either low or inscrutable. Even if Lisa's premises here are false, it doesn't follow that Lisa's holding them is the result of cognitive malfunction. The crucial
beliefs in Elvis' case are: (A) if there is a God, then God would not permit my
mother to die unless he had a good reason for doing so and (8) my mother is
dead and God had no reason for permitting her to die. Perhaps the consequent of (A) is false, or maybe the second conjunct of (8) is false. But why suppose that Elvis' holding these beliefs is the result of cognitive malfunction.
Maybe he has taken on the testimony of the preacher that (C) God has reasons
for allowing evil and (D) if God has reasons for allowing evil then he either
reveals them to us or otherwise consoles us by providing some outward sign.
Suppose further that Elvis holds the true belief that God has provided neither
signs nor reasons for allowing the death of Elvis' mother. Even if the preacher
came to hold these beliefs because of some cognitive disorder, Elvis takes
them on testimony and they form an essential part of a deductively valid
argument against the existence of God. And Elvis believes nothing else that
could neutralize or otherwise defeat the defeater (even though clearly he
could).
13. Plantinga mentioned the first analogy in correspondence and introduced the second analogy in response to an earlier draft of this paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion in San
Francisco, California, November 22,1997.
14. There's a closely related problem worth pursuing here that I'll only
mention in passing. I'm not sure that Plantinga's definition of a defeater in
chapter 11 of WCB is logically consistent with his claims in chapters 10, 11,
and 14 that there can be defeaters for theistic belief. His definition (see endnote
no. 4) requires for D to be a defeater for S's belief B that any person S* who
holds 8 and comes to believe D (and has the same noetic structure) would
withhold 8 if S*'s cognitive faculties are functioning properly in tile relevant
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respects. Since Plantinga permits an irrational belief to serve as a defeater (even
against a rational belief), he correctly notes that "relevant" proper function
must be understood to permit cases where the defeater arises from cognitive
malfunction and serves as irrational input to the defeater system. But
Plantinga claims that if a person acquires a defeater for theistic belief it is only
because the sensus divinitatis is not properly functioning, not necessarily
because of irrational input to the defeater system originating from some other
malfunctioning faculty. At the very least it is not clear that a malfunctioning
SCIlSUS divinitatis is consistent with having a defeater for theistic belief. Does
this not qualify as a relevant cognitive malfunction? A person S may acquire
some other belief D (the putative defeater), but since any person S* whose
cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the respects relevant to the
truth-aimed production and sustenance of theistic belief would not withhold
B (by virtue of the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis), D is not a
defeater against B for S. Thus, either there can be defeaters for theistic belief
or there cannot. If there cannot be defeaters for theistic belief, Plantinga loses
his rebutting argument against the charge of fideism. If there are defeaters for
theistic belief, then (by Plantinga's definition) the design plan makes provision for withholding theistic belief in some circumstances. But Plantinga's
account of the sensus divinitatis and his arguments for the irrationality of religious unbelief imply that the design plan makes no provision for the withholding of theistic belief. So it seems like there cannot be defeaters for theistic
belief after all. Plantinga actually entertains the plausibility of this conclusion
in chapter 14 of WeB. See endnote no. 11.
15. I should think that the same thing is true in the case of memory beliefs
and belief in other minds. Memory beliefs are easy enough. I believe that my
friends and I had grilled chicken on our camp-out last summer, but then I pull
out the video and see that in fact we had hamburgers and hotdogs. But now
think about belief in other minds. Suppose a man is frozen for hundreds of
years through cryonics. During that time all human persons on earth are gradually replaced by look-alike/ act-alike androids, a process perhaps necessitated by high levels of cosmic radiation that slowly destroyed the human race.
When the ice-man thaws he initially holds his belief that there other minds.
After all, he looks around and everyone looks and acts like humans and he
has no reason to think otherwise, but he eventually uncovers evidence (in the
form of videos and written documents spanning over a hundred years or so)
which provides strong support for the proposition that all humans were eventually replaced by these android replicas. No longer believing in the existence
of other minds, at least human ones, would seem to be PF-rational, even if the
ice-man is fitted with a module that produces belief in other minds in most
other circumstances. Neither that module, nor any other, seems to be malfunctioning in this instance. Moreover, it seems that the same sort of conclusion
would follow if in fact his belief was false (perhaps there are a few last
humans alive in caves somewhere in Arizona or the whole thing is some hitech, virtual reality experiment performed on the ice-man by the government).
16. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting
of the American Academy of Religion on November 22, 1997 in San Francisco,
California. I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga for his comments on the earlier
draft and the correspondence that generated the paper. Thanks also to Kelly
Clark and Linda Zagzebski for helpful comments on the original draft of this
paper.

